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One is bound to employ the currency that is in use in the country one is 
exploring—in our case a neurotic currency.  
Sigmund Freud, Formulations of the Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning (1911) 
 
This article does not set out to forge an impervious argument but to juxtapose a series 
of impressions, like so many flashes of light, from which to intimate a shift in the 
history of European reading.1 This coheres, at the turn of the twentieth century, 
around perceptions of Australian Aboriginality. My impressions have three sources: 
(a) high-profile British novels of the 1850s and 1860s with settings in, or significant 
references to, the Australian colonies; (b) ‘discoveries’ made by scientists of reading 
after 1878; and (c) the work of deeply influential European modernists James Frazer, 
Sigmund Freud and Émile Durkheim, whose theories of the evolution of religious 
belief made extensive use of Francis Gillen’s and Baldwin Spencer’s work on the 
Arrernte people, notably The Native Tribes of Central Australia (1899). In the 
interests of space I will here form impressions principally from sources (b) and (c), 
while my assertions about set (a) must, for the most part, be taken on trust. Within set 
(c), moreover, I will focus on Freud’s Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the 
Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, a work first published in German in the 
journal Imago in 1912-1913.  
 
Before proceeding let me note that Freud and his contemporaries interested 
themselves in Australian Aboriginal peoples for two reasons: firstly, Australian 
cultures represented, in these writers’ minds, the world’s most primitive cultures; and 
secondly, the sheer success of the invasive imperial settlement of Aboriginal lands 
made data on them relatively easy to obtain. As Frazer put it in his 1911-12 Gifford 
Lectures: 
 
Just as biology or the science of life naturally begins with the study of the 
lowest sorts of living beings, the humble protozoa, so we shall begin our 
enquiry with a study of the lowest savages of whom we possess a 
comparatively full and accurate record, namely, the aborigines of 
Australia. (Frazer 71)2 
 
This is, of course, a completely discredited premise, but the erroneous ideas it gives 
rise to are highly significant for my purposes. Below I will illustrate the ideas, and 
their invalidity, by discussing at length a scene in Rolf de Heer’s and Peter Djiggir’s 
film Ten Canoes (2006). 
 
 
JASAL	  2010	  Special	  Issue:	  Common	  Readers	   Henderson:	  Reading	  and	  the	  ‘Mental	  Lives	  of	  Savages’	  
	   2	  
I 
In or about 1878, reading changed. Working in the Paris laboratory of Émile Javal, 
one Monsieur Lamare heard it change, just after his assistant had seen and then felt it 
change. 
 
Un aide peut voir ces mouvements ; il peut les sentir avec les doigts 
posés sur la paupière fermée d’un œil. 
 
Mais le procédé qui donne les meilleurs résultats est celui par lequel on 
entend ces mouvements au moyen d’un petit tambour, dont la membrane 
d’ébonite supporte à son centre une petite tige qui s’applique sur un 
point du globe oculaire (conjonctive ou paupière), sans aucun 
inconvénient et dont la caisse communique avec les oreilles à l’aide de 
deux tuyaux de caoutchouc. (Lamare quoted in Javal 129)3 
 
What Lamare heard laid the foundation for the modern science of eye-movement 
while reading. And it still has the power to surprise readers. Shut your left eye by 
gently holding down the lid with your finger. As you continue reading this page with 
your right eye, you will feel your left eyeball make a series of short, sharp jumps, 
while experiencing no such sensation from your right eye. Really both eyes are 
working in unison: the jumps you feel from your left eye are caused by the series of 
jerks (saccades) and pauses (fixations) effected by your right eye while it reads. 
Perhaps the most disconcerting thing about replicating Lamare’s discovery is the 
sense of losing control of reading coupled with the ‘robotic’ precision of the eye’s 
newly evident movements.  
 
After Lamare’s discovery, the science of reading proceeded, in Dieter Heller’s words, 
as a veritable ‘cult of apparatuses’, with increasingly elaborate equipment devised to 
observe, measure, and record saccades and fixations (Heller 37).4 This research also 
found the eye’s gathering of information from the page was limited to those moments 
when it ‘fixated’ momentarily at a particular point along the line, reacting to general 
shapes, not individual letters, before making its leap to the next point. In 1908 
Edmund Burke Huey recognized this as the decisive break from the historic 
understanding of reading. The ‘old and deeply rooted assumption’ about the 
smoothness of reading, wrote Huey, ‘was founded partly on the general belief that the 
eye passed from letter to letter along the line, the recognitions following the fixation 
point successively’, but science had proved otherwise (Huey 71).  
 
Reading science’s fixation-saccade series is the first of my impressions; experimental 
psychology’s concept of projection is the second.  
 
 
II 
When inferring psychological processes from their new physiological observations of 
the reading eye, reading scientists built on Hermann von Helmholtz’s ‘theory of the 
interpretation of the visual sensations’ (Helmholtz, Treatise I.47).5 Working with 
principles of sensory perception established by Johannes Peter Müller, Helmholtz 
asserted that the brain does not make vision from light but from stimulations of nerve 
cells as variously qualified by the intensity, wavelength and direction of the light 
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falling upon the retina. The brain thus interpreted retinal stimulations symbolically, 
projecting the reality that was most likely to have caused such stimulations in the first 
place: 
 
Thus all the stimulations of the fibres of the optic nerve are referred out in 
space, according to the law by which luminous phenomena are supposed 
to occur in those parts of the field (or of both fields), where material 
objects appear to be that are in such a position to send light to the 
corresponding places on the retina. (Helmholtz, Treatise III.260)  
 
Huey’s The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading (1908) marks the point where 
Helmholtz’s projection theory of visual perception is applied to a fully articulated 
theory of reading, including an explicit assertion that words on the page, also, are 
‘referred out in space’ when reading. This derived from Huey’s own experiments, 
building on more than a decade of similar work by others, which conclusively 
demonstrated that readers fill in, that is project and ‘see’, letters which ought to be in 
certain word-shapes but which, in the experiments, had been removed by various 
means.  
 
In reading, the deficient picture is filled in, retouched, by the mind, and 
the page is thus made to present the familiar appearance of completeness 
in its details which we suppose to exist in the actual page. The defective 
retinal picture, taken in connection with all the other clews [sic] available 
to consciousness at the moment, means such a page, and we project this 
meaning outward, just as we fill in mentally the gap in the visual field left 
by the blind spot. (Huey 67-8) 
 
Huey concludes: 
 
The simple fact is that the words and all other objects that we ever see are 
thus thrown outward, projected upon a page in the case of reading, 
somewhat as a lantern might throw them outward upon a screen. In the 
case of perception it might be said that the mind furnishes the screen as 
well. (Huey 106)  
 
Projection for Huey, then, is the principal function by which perception, and therefore 
reading, occurs: ‘perception is always a projection or localization outward of 
consciousness’. Actual print matter has a part to play—perception ‘is aroused or 
suggested by the stimulations that have come inward’—but it ‘is conditioned strongly, 
also, from within’ (Huey 105). In fact there is an almost instantaneous interplay 
between ‘stimulations that have come inward’ and projection, a form of reality 
testing, such that, with practice, an increasingly accurate though never absolutely 
foolproof vision of reality—in this case of what is actually printed on the page—is 
produced.6  
 
 
III 
In Freud’s theory of projection, the next impression, projection is identified as ‘a 
primitive mechanism’, an ancient formation in the evolution of mental life pre-dating 
all forms of ‘reality-testing’, indeed needing no external phenomena to proceed. Now 
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Darwin, not Freud, is the progenitor usually identified in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century reading science; but Freud’s own Darwinism enables the 
juxtaposition of his theories and the ‘discoveries’ made by reading scientists. Two of 
Freud’s fantasies of evolutionary history will be useful in this regard: his construction 
of what I will refer to as a primeval slug, ‘an undifferentiated vesicle of a substance 
that is susceptible to stimulation’, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle from 1920; and 
his description of the primal horde at the end of Totem and Taboo. 
 
These fantasies are deployed by Freud to describe in evolutionary terms two 
fundamental principles of his psychology: resistance (here, protection against 
stimulation) and projection. The first, resistance, rests on the counterintuitive notion 
that our senses develop as much from a need to limit stimulation as to obtain 
information, as derived from the primeval slug’s predicament, ‘suspended in an 
external world charged with the most powerful energies; … it would be killed by the 
stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protective shield 
against stimuli’ (Freud, Beyond 297). Thanks to an evolutionary hardening of the 
slug’s outer layer 
 
the energies of the external world are able to pass into the next 
underlying layers, which have remained living, with only a fragment of 
their original intensity; and these layers can devote themselves, behind 
the protective shield, to the reception of the amounts of stimulus which 
have been allowed through it. … Protection against stimuli is an almost 
more important function for the living organism than reception of stimuli. 
(Freud, Beyond 297-8) 
 
‘In highly developed organisms’, Freud goes on, the senses have developed behind 
the shield ‘to take small specimens of the external world, to sample it in small 
quantities’ (Freud, Beyond 298). Thus the senses ‘may perhaps be compared with 
feelers which are all the time making tentative advances towards the external world 
and then drawing back from it’ (Freud, Beyond 299).  
 
The first thing to note here is the correspondence between fixations and sampling. To 
extend the correspondence, one can see the fixation-saccade series in the notion of 
‘feelers which are all the time making tentative advances towards the external world 
[fixation] and then drawing back from it [saccade]’. The second thing to note is 
Freud’s subsequent problematisation of the distinction between the slug’s response to 
external and internal stimuli.  
 
Towards the outside [the living vesicle] is shielded against stimuli, and 
the amounts of excitation impinging on it have only a reduced effect. 
Towards the inside there can be no such shield; the excitations in the 
deeper layers extend into the system directly and in undiminished amount, 
in so far as certain of their characteristics give rise to feelings in the 
pleasure-unpleasure series. … This state of things produces two definite 
results. First, the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure … predominate over 
all external stimuli. And secondly, a particular way of dealing with any 
internal excitations which produce too great an increase of unpleasure: 
there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the 
inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield 
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against stimuli into operation as a means of defence against them. This is 
the origin of projection, which is destined to play such a large part in the 
causation of pathological processes. (Freud, Beyond 300-301) 
 
Freud’s prioritisation of internal excitations in the primeval slug is also evident in his 
1911 paper Formulations of the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, where he 
reasons that a  
 
state of psychical rest was originally disturbed by the peremptory 
demands of internal needs. When this happened, whatever was thought of 
(wished for) was simply presented in a hallucinatory manner, just as still 
happens to-day with our dream-thoughts every night. (37) 
 
Projection is here the first-born psychical activity and proceeds, with no reference to 
reality, as a full-blown hallucination: the living substance simply dreams up the 
satisfaction of its internal need (like hallucinating the consumption of food when 
hungry). This notion is elaborated in a footnote: 
 
It will be rightly objected that an organization which was a slave to the 
pleasure principle and neglected the reality of the external world could not 
maintain itself alive for the shortest time, so that it could not have come 
into existence at all. The employment of a fiction like this is, however, 
justified when one considers that the infant—provided one includes with 
it the care it receives from its mother—does almost realize a psychical 
system of this kind. It probably hallucinates the fulfilment of its internal 
needs; it betrays its unpleasure, when there is an increase of stimulus and 
an absence of satisfaction, by the motor discharge of screaming and 
beating about with its arms and legs, and it then experiences the 
satisfaction it has hallucinated. (Freud, Formulations 37) 
 
Using the hallucinating baby as an example of a primeval ‘organization which was a 
slave to the pleasure principle’ Freud converts into psychological terms the principle 
from embryology that humans pass through prior evolutionary states in the course of 
their physical development.  
 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud is concerned with how the ‘primitive mechanism’ of 
unmediated projection, still evinced momentarily in infant behaviour, conditions 
‘primitive’ culture. This is contrasted to the psychological mechanisms proper to 
‘civilised’ persons and cultures wherein projection, while still powerful, has been 
counterbalanced by perception.  
 
The projection of inner perceptions to the outside is a primitive 
mechanism which, for instance, also influences our sense-perceptions, so 
that it normally has the greatest share in shaping our outer world. … 
[E]ven inner perceptions of ideational and emotional processes are 
projected outwardly, like sense perceptions, and are used to shape the 
outer world, whereas they ought to remain in the inner world. […] Only 
with the development of a language of abstract thought through the 
association of sensory remnants of word representations with inner 
processes, did the latter gradually become capable of perception. Before 
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this took place primitive man had developed a picture of the outer world 
through the outward projection of inner perceptions, which we, with our 
reinforced conscious perception, must now translate back into 
psychology. (825) 
 
This statement requires some unpacking: the issue is the distinction between 
projection (marked as primitive) and perception (marked as advanced/civilized); or 
more accurately between ‘outward projection of inner perceptions’ and ‘reinforced 
conscious perception’ of the ‘outer world’.  
 
Let me clarify this distinction with reference to a scene in Ten Canoes. That is, I 
propose to clarify Freud’s notion of the ‘primitive’ projection of inner perceptions by 
concocting a Freudian misreading of the scene. 
 
In the scene, tribal warrior Ridjimiraril (Crusoe Kurddal) spies an intruder whom he 
suspects is the kidnapper of his wife. Spearing the man at a distance, Ridjimiriral is 
dismayed to discover that he has killed a complete stranger. He and fellow elder 
Birrinbirrin (Richard Birrinbirrin) are considering what to do next when the screech of 
a cockatoo causes them to look cautiously about themselves. Clearly the screech 
means something significant to Ridjimiriral and Birrinbirrin which is impenetrable for 
most viewers. Elsewhere I have developed an approach to Ten Canoes which would 
render Ridjimiraril’s and Birrinbirrin’s reaction a deeply perceptive and entirely 
sensible response to a very real and materially threatening power; in this approach the 
characters’ perception exceeds that of a non-Indigenous audience (Henderson). In my 
Freudian (mis)reading the perceptive abilities of the audience—here an audience of 
one; Freud—exceeds that of the ‘primitive’ characters: Ridjimiraril and Birrinbirrin 
are projecting inner processes which do not tally with reality as he knows it through 
the ‘reinforced conscious perception’ of the evolved human being. He ‘translate[s]’ 
the reactions ‘back into psychology’, surmising that the cockatoo lives in 
Ridjimiraril’s and Birrinbirrin’s ‘picture of the outer world’ developed ‘through the 
outward projection of inner perceptions’; it lives in their dream-world, and it does so 
as a demonic ancestor. This rises from the fact that Australian Aboriginals, according 
to Freud, have advanced on hallucinating babies. They are not simply hallucinating the 
fulfilment of inner needs—like dreaming the consumption of breast-milk—but 
projecting ‘inner perceptions of ideational and emotional processes’, namely the most 
ancient of belief systems: totemism.  
 
Now what distinguished Freud’s approach to totemism from that of his contemporaries 
is his focus on taboo customs as cause and explanation of the totem (for others taboos 
are effects of totemism), and his drawing a comparison between taboos and the 
prohibitions created by ‘compulsion neurotics’. ‘Primitive’ culture is therefore 
extrapolated from the pathological processes of neurotic individuals.7 Expanding on 
taboos, Freud writes that they 
 
are very ancient prohibitions which at one time were forced upon a 
generation of primitive people from without, that is, they probably were 
forcibly impressed upon them by an earlier generation. These prohibitions 
concerned actions for which there existed a strong desire. (Freud, Totem 
799) 
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In this case Ridjimiraril’s actions (the spearing of a formidable stranger) rouses 
inherited guilt derived from ancient veneration for a powerful figure—an elder—
which was unconsciously accompanied by a desire to kill that figure. When the elder 
dies, the prohibited desire is transformed into unconscious self-chastisement which is 
projected onto the dead body rendering it demonic. ‘[D]emons’, writes Freud, are 
‘mere projections of hostile feelings which the survivor entertains towards the dead’ 
(Freud, Totem 823). As the real memory of the actual ancestor fades, the ‘capacity for 
displacement’ of ‘taboo customs’ (and ‘symptoms of compulsion neurosis’) transpires 
(Freud, Totem 797): the demonic presence is displaced onto another object. In this 
case the cockatoo has been imbued with accusatory powers. Thus, in a Freudian view, 
Ridjimiraril’s murder of the stranger is the transgression of a taboo which was always 
already desired: to destroy the power of others.  
 
Another key aspect of my Freudian (mis)reading of the Ten Canoes scene is the 
simultaneity of Ridjimiraril’s and Birrinbirrin’s reaction to the cockatoo: a ‘primitive’ 
group psychology is in place. This is derived, in the Freudian view, from the 
Aboriginals’ perceived proximity, in Freud’s evolutionary terms, to the ‘original 
deed’ that prompted both the first group projection of unconscious guilt onto an 
external object and the sociability that process obtained. The ‘deed’, as described in 
the final section of Totem and Taboo, is the banding together of sons of a sexually-
dominant male of the ‘primal horde’ to murder and eat their father, distribute his 
females between them, share the guilt, invest the murdered father’s body with 
demonic power, and, at regular intervals, ritually re-enact the moment (in a ‘totem 
feast’) which marked the beginning of their society (Freud, Totem 884). It is the 
shared projection of the inner processes to which this ‘deed’ gave rise which more 
generally manifests itself as totemism. 
 
In this regard, totemism for Freud is a ‘stage’ in the development of cultural life that 
has been surpassed in more ‘advanced’ cultures through individual reality-testing. As 
Freud writes in Formulations of the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, the 
development of the ‘reality principle’ was a ‘momentous step’ in evolution, 
heightening ‘the importance … of the sense-organs that are directed towards the 
external world, and of the consciousness attached to them’, enabling the 
comprehension of qualities other than of pleasure or unpleasure, namely ‘whether a 
given idea was true or false’, engendering ‘attention’ from the ‘special function … 
which had periodically to search the external world, in order that its data might be 
familiar already if an urgent internal need should arise’, necessitating the formation of 
memory, where such data is stored, and translating ‘screaming and beating about’ into 
‘action’, the necessary restraint on which led to ‘thinking’ (37-8).  
 
The evolutionary model of cultural development apparently occasioned by the reality 
principle can also be illustrated through Ridjimiraril’s cockatoo. For a start, if 
Ridjimiraril had had, in the Freudian (mis)reading, ‘a language of abstract thought 
through the association of sensory remnants of word representations with inner 
processes’, he would have been able to perceive rather than simply project his own 
beliefs: it is the difference between seeing/hearing a demonic ancestor (projection) 
and saying I believe that cockatoo is a demonic ancestor (perception). If, pursuing 
this view, Ridjimiraril’s mental life had developed still further, his conscious 
perception (‘I believe that cockatoo is a demonic ancestor’) would be ‘reinforced’ by 
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reality-testing and the powers of the cockatoo would diminish as they are tested by the 
senses through experience and are discussed in a language of abstract thought.  
 
In modernity the cockatoo loses all that remains of its original ‘richness’ of meaning 
to become a comparatively weak (‘empirical’) creature of science. So too, for Freud, 
science abolishes the last major remnant in ‘civilized’ societies of collectively 
projecting non-reality-tested inner processes: religion. Thus the extraordinary reality-
testing enabled by scientific apparatus—modernity’s prosthetic sensory organs—
leaves humankind in a ‘sober world where there are only material values’. Hence 
Freud’s warning when considering ‘the world of primitive man’: 
 
We must beware of introducing the contempt for what is merely thought 
or wished which characterizes our sober world where there are only 
material values, into the world of primitive man and the neurotic, which is 
full of inner riches only. (Freud, Totem 897)8 
 
If collectively projected religious belief has diminished, in modern individuals (and in 
unusually situated groups of individuals), another remnant of the pleasure principle’s 
former domination of mental life is retained. Freud writes: 
 
With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-
activity was split off; it was kept free from reality-testing and remained 
subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. This activity is phantasying 
[sic], which begins already in children’s play, and later, continued as 
daydreaming, abandons dependence on real objects. (Freud, Formulations 
39) 
 
Here ‘daydreaming’ and ‘phantasying’—words forged in ‘the language of abstract 
thought through the association of sensory remnants of word representations with 
inner processes’—circumscribe projection with perception: because of the reality 
principle one can know about its occasional surrender. Meanwhile, the artist, for 
Freud, works with another ‘reconciliation’ of sorts between the pleasure and the 
reality principles:  
 
An artist is originally a man who turns away from reality because he 
cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction 
which it at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes 
full play in the life of phantasy. He finds his way back to reality, however, 
from this world of phantasy by making use of special gifts to mould 
phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are valued by men as precious 
reflections of reality. Thus in a certain fashion he actually becomes the 
hero, the king, the creator, or the favourite he desired to be, without 
following the long round-about path of making real alterations in the 
external world. But he can only achieve this because other men feel the 
same dissatisfaction as he does with the renunciation demanded by reality, 
and because that dissatisfaction, which results from the replacement of the 
pleasure principle by the reality principle, is itself a part of reality. (Freud, 
Formulations 41-2) 
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What interests me here is the implication for readers of this vision of novelists as 
artists, as those who also momentarily turn away from reality to recognize nonetheless 
‘precious reflections of reality’ in a strategically sanctioned ‘phantasy’. The reading 
of fiction, then, relies on the ‘one species of thought-activity’ which ‘was split off’ 
from reality testing, where the ‘primitive mechanism’ of projection is resurgent. In 
this light modern novel-reading involves a momentary resurgence of ‘savage’ 
mentality.  
 
This notion can be clarified with reference to Freud’s early monograph On Aphasia 
(1891). There he accounts for a series of associations which determine childhood 
processes of learning to speak, read and write. A printed word invokes a memory of 
sound, notably a particular sound made by our parents, which ‘acquires its meaning 
by being linked to an “object-presentation”’ which ‘itself is a complex of associations 
made up of the greatest variety of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinaesthetic and other 
presentations’ (Freud Aphasia 221; emphasis mine). To read (and comprehend) is to 
follow a set of associations between printed shapes and object-presentations, the latter 
being open ended and peculiar to the individual though reality-testing renders them 
similar enough across the group to enable communication. That is, the printed word 
‘apple’ is collectively associated with individual memories of sensory experiences of 
an apple which reality testing renders sufficiently similar across the group for us to 
agree on the association. Unless a specified apple is within reach of the reader, the 
word ‘apple’ printed in a novel or its counterpart in a biological treatise provoke much 
the same set of mental processes. The difference with novel-reading is that the world 
in which the apple has meaning is understood to be a virtual one. That world may 
afford ‘precious reflections of reality’, but it is not necessarily subject to reality 
testing in the same way: an entirely alternative reality (say, where apples float in the 
air) may have been collectively endorsed by readers in their submission to the author 
as ‘king’. What distinguishes this from the collective projection by ‘savages’ of an 
‘unreal’ epistemology is the suspension of disbelief. 
 
That is, curbing the lasting return of savage mentality in modern novel-reading is a 
perpetual return to ‘dissatisfaction’ with the nonetheless acknowledged necessity of 
‘the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle’ (Freud, 
Formulations 42).9 Put another way, a ‘primitive mechanism’ is necessary to the 
creation of any virtual world, but modern novel-reading must restrict as soon as it 
releases this capacity: recurrently one must also see reality; that one is reading. 
Modern novel-reading might be characterised, then, as the rhythmic release and 
containment (the management) of savagery-neurosis.10 
 
 
IV  
The juxtaposition of Freud’s notion of primitive projection and the discoveries of 
reading science creates the fourth, highly speculative impression: that the rhythmic 
release and containment of savagery-neurosis that characterizes modern reading might 
be located in the fixation-saccade series.  
 
In Freudian terms a fixation is a sampling of reality which is tested against memories 
of similar data gathered in the memory, an almost instant exchange between retinal 
excitation and vision (the latter itself understood as a mediated process of projection). 
But in the saccade the opposite of sampling occurs: seemingly, nothing. As Palmer 
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notes, a saccade is very rapid indeed, but it is not so fast that optical nerves could not 
be stimulated by the light they receive during the jump. What is certain, however, is 
that a consequent blurred dash is not projected during reading. Even today, as Palmer 
notes, the ‘physiological mechanisms’ of ‘saccadic suppression’ or ‘masking are 
currently unknown’; nobody knows why we see nothing during a saccade (Palmer 
523-24). Something may occur—a blur of light—which is immediately masked by the 
brain; or nothing may happen at all.  
 
It is in this paradoxical saccade I would locate the momentary resurgence of ‘savage’ 
mental life. It is, in my view, not the only place where Freud’s concept of ‘savage’ 
mental life might be found in reading—it finds a place wherever there is projection of 
inner states, including the ‘localization outward’ of letters during fixation—but in the 
saccade Freudian savagery prevails over all for a split second. As such, the saccade 
occasions regression to the mentality of ‘savage’ man: both total projection and a 
momentarily fantasised fulfilment of the death-wish (regression to inanimation). 
Hence the saccade becomes at once a flash of light and its mask. And hence modern 
reading can be characterized as an oscillation between the resurgence of projection 
(saccade) and its circumscription by perception (fixation).  
 
Rather than being drawn from a single textual source, this model of ‘how readers 
were thought to have read’ is formed from impressions of nineteenth-century 
physiological optics, the science of reading and Freud’s evolutionary psychology. But 
from it we can infer an actual change in how novel-readers really read: the role of 
something like the unconscious in reading could only be articulated where there is 
both a questioning of the existence of a soul, and consciousness of the inadequacy of 
consciousness in the account of reading. In fact a number of high-profile British 
novels from the third quarter of the nineteenth century which share references to the 
Australasian colonies continuously conscripted readers to test what parts of their 
selves—body, mind and/or soul—took part in the act of reading, and to consider the 
broader philosophical and religious implications of the results of their 
experimentation. When, for example, in Edward Bulwer Lytton’s A Strange Story 
(1862), Dr Julius Faber contends ‘that images can be seen even by the blind as 
distinctly and vividly as you and I now see the stream below our feet and the 
opossums at play upon yonder boughs’, the seeing blind are Dr Faber’s rhetorical 
clairvoyants, invoked while he is in Australia, but also Bulwer Lytton’s British 
readers, readers who ‘saw’ the stream and the opossums at play ‘yonder’, but for 
whom ‘yonder’ was also only so many black marks on a page (Bulwer Lytton Ch. 
71). Elsewhere in the novel there is reference to ‘an extraordinary cerebral activity, a 
projectile force given to the mind, distinct from the soul, by which it sends forth its 
own emanations to a distance in spite of material obstacles’ (Bulwer Lytton, Ch. 31). 
This ‘projectile force’ is nothing if not like an occult version of science’s projection, 
and it is this which is brought into dialogue with the very process in which Bulwer 
Lytton’s readers were engaged: projecting Australia as the place to confront reading’s 
inner mysteries.  
 
 
V 
The fifth impression, then, is that representations of Australia in the mid-Victorian 
novel conscript explorations of the unconscious, though in pre-Freudian terms.11 To 
create this impression one need look no further than resonances between Freud’s 1912 
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Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis and Dickens’s Australia. Freud introduces 
the unconscious in his Note by discussing ‘psychical elements’ which are ‘present’, 
‘absent’ then ‘present again’ (Freud, Note 50). He posits that ‘an unconscious 
conception is one of which we are not aware, but the existence of which we are 
nevertheless ready to admit on account of other proofs or signs’, not least this return 
from absence (Freud, Note 51). In both David Copperfield (1850) and Great 
Expectations (1861), characters present in the action become absent when they go to 
Australia. The continent remains wholly inferred: its actual existence within the 
worlds of both novels can only be admitted ‘on account of other proofs or signs’, that 
is, the return of those characters bearing histories of their transformation. 
 
But Australia as forged in mid-Victorian novel-reading does not so much anticipate 
the character of Freud’s unconscious as modernize mental habits traditionally aroused 
in the encounter with narratives of the Antipodes. For centuries Europeans have 
staged pageants exposing the inner workings of the imagination in the Antipodes: it is 
imagination’s realm. In Richard Brome’s 1638 play The Antipodes this process is 
rendered explicit: the scenes set in the Antipodes are presented as a play-within-the-
play of which the protagonist, Peregrine, is unaware. Thinking he has really travelled 
to, and must prevail on, the other side of the globe, the territory Peregrine must 
actually confront and conquer is his own psyche. For, unlike the protagonist, the 
audience knows Peregrine’s physician has set out to immerse him in a virtual 
(hemi)sphere of Antipodean madness to cure him of an obsession with travel 
narratives. Overall The Antipodes advocates the healthiness of playing (role-playing 
and play-making) conditioned by knowledge that one is doing it. So too, one should 
enjoy travelling to distant lands via print culture as long as one also sees oneself 
reading (and so knows one is not really ‘there’ but ‘here’). 
 
The European Antipodes tradition exposed by Brome underwent a process of 
modernization in the course of the nineteenth century: the location of the Antipodes 
wandered less about the globe, settling for the most part on the Australasian colonies. 
The Antipodes was ‘realized’, its object-presentations ‘hardened’. In the same century 
technological advances in media communications greatly expanded the virtual world 
of print culture. Measures for the successful negotiation of that world became more 
sophisticated, just as they became more necessary to ordinary readers: new techniques 
of ‘realist’ representation (be it in terms of journalist reportage, literary style, or 
graphic illustration) made print culture ever more convincing; seeing oneself 
consuming text, not reality, was an increasingly vital skill, one accompanied by 
suspicion of surface appearance. In this manner of reading, the word-shape 
‘Australia’, denoting a noble seat of empire, ought also to be recognised as ‘a trap-
door to the Antipodes’, to quote Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s 1862 sensation novel Lady 
Audley’s Secret (Braddon 154), denoting the opposite of a noble seat, the coexistent 
readings encapsulating the savagery and madness that might underlie anything’s or 
anyone’s public appearance. In the same novel George Talboys is the archetype of 
one who is unable to grasp such modern dualities: a failed reader. He believes a 
misleading account of the gold rushes, precipitously abandoning his wife for a life-
threatening stint in the Australian bush; he forgets the other side of the world (that 
things in Britain will change) when there; and on his return he takes the false notice of 
his wife’s death in The Times at face value; all mistakes that leave him 
psychologically broken. Overall Lady Audley’s Secret dramatizes, and conscripts 
readers to confront, the joint processes I infer: the outbreak of madness/savagery 
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under realism’s shield; and the role of the Antipodes in exacerbating the process. 
These are as much signs of the novel’s modernity as its plot’s references to new 
Victorian technologies.  
 
Correspondingly, Aboriginal characters in the mid-Victorian Antipodes novel embody 
the imagination run wild, something the reader must allow (to prevail in modernity) at 
the same time as contain (to avoid madness/regression). Hence, in A Strange Story an 
encounter between the British narrator, Dr Fenwick, and three Aboriginal Australians 
can be read as staging a confrontation between the two functions of modern reading: 
 
A band of the savage natives were stealthily creeping on my track. … 
[T]hree hideous forms suddenly faced me, springing up from a thicket, all 
tangled with honeysuckles and creepers of blue and vermilion. I walked 
steadily up to them. They halted a moment or so in suspense; but perhaps 
they were scared by my stature or awed by my aspect; and the Unfamiliar, 
though Human, had terror for them, as the Unfamiliar, although but a 
Shadow, had had terror for me. They vanished, and as quickly as if they 
had crept into the earth. (Bulwer Lytton, Ch. 72) 
 
In the course of Bulwer Lytton’s novel Dr Fenwick must incorporate reality’s 
terrifying shadow—the occult—into what begins as a materialist Inquiry into Organic 
Life and ends as A Strange Story. He must, then, acknowledge and surpass these 
elusive ‘savages’ by recognising them as his own rational mind’s Shadow, 
incorporating them as subjects of his psyche, ‘as if they had crept into’ his self. (It is a 
portentous reading of Freud’s phrase: ‘we can recognize in their psychic life a well-
preserved, early stage of our own development’ (Freud, Totem 775)). Similarly, 
although Bulwer Lytton’s Aboriginals are explicitly placed on the frontier of the 
human, in the novel’s finale a demonic white character, Margrave, takes centre-stage 
as embodiment of in-humanity, exceeding the ‘the wild dwellers on the verge’ in that 
he chose (where ‘primitive’ characters can never choose) to become as he did: the 
Aboriginal tribe are instead silent witnesses to Margrave’s spectacular demise, and to 
their British readers’ annexation of their powers.  
 
 
VI 
There are good reasons to object to exploiting, in a cultural history of Australia, links 
between this country and the unconscious: it threatens to re-assert imperialist visions 
of the invasion of Aboriginal country as the gradual emergence of a continent from 
primeval darkness to rational light, a notion given monumental form in Harold 
Parker’s The Awakening of Australia (c.1915) at the eastern entrance to London’s 
Australia House (Fig. 1). Applied to a history of Australian literature (writing), the 
Antipodes can also reduce the country to a site where imperfect mimics—unauthors 
like Mr Micawber in David Copperfield—prevail. There may be something positive 
to be drawn from the latter: to capture Australian life produces as much stuttering as 
the articulation of an unconscious. But what there is definitely to be gained from not 
rejecting Europe’s construction of an irrational hemisphere, and its compulsive 
insistence on making Australia its metonym, derives from recognizing that country in 
the European reader’s mind as nothing less than the space of reading, as where 
reading takes place. It is a country that warrants exploration precisely because it is at 
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Aboriginality, but the unspoken and challenging premise of Totem and Taboo is that 
other cultures are to be met at the extremity of one’s own intellectual capacity within 
one’s own tradition. The exploration of this weird, other Australia, which is also my 
country, begins with the inversion of an awakening, and there one is bound to employ 
a neurotic currency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 	  
1 My cautiousness is determined by an unanswerable question that is the motor of my 
research, one voiced by Nicholas Dames in The Physiology of the Novel (2007): 
‘How, then, did the readers of the past—for my purposes, the Victorian novel-
reader—read? What transpired in mind and body as reading occurred?’ (6). Dames 
admits that ‘We may not be able wholly to know how the novel-readers of the past 
read’, but by revisiting theories of the inner processes of reading by Victorian critics 
who responded to science, he is able to conclude that ‘we can know how [readers of 
the past] were thought to have read’ (56). My venture, however, is yet more tenuous, 
merely inferring even the model of how readers were thought to have read, and doing 	  
Figure 1:  
Harold Parker, The Awakening of Australia, c.1915  
Australia House, London 
Photograph: Ian Henderson 
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so not from single-authored documents, but from a loosely organised, 
interdisciplinary and transnational collection of ‘other proofs and signs’ (Freud, Note 
51). 2	  Similarly, on the first page of Totem and Taboo, Freud states he has chosen for his 
study ‘those tribes which have been described by ethnographists as being the most 
backward and wretched of tribes: the aborigines of [...] Australia’ (775).	  
3 ‘An assistant can see these movements; he can feel them with fingers poised on the 
closed eye-lid. But the process which gives the best results is one where you hear 
these movements by means of a small drum with an ebonite membrane, the centre of 
which supports a blunt needle which is attached, without discomfort, to the eyeball 
(conjunctive or pupil), and the vibrations of which are communicated to the ears by 
means of two rubber tubes.’ Lamare’s research was first reported by Javal in the 
Annales d’oculistique of November-December 1879. 
4 See Wade and Tatler for a definitive history of eye-movement research.  
5 Helmholtz’s theory was developed in his massive Handbook of Physiological Optics 
which appeared in stages from the mid 1850s; it was expressed more accessibly in one 
of his popular lectures on science, the ‘The Theory of Vision’, published in 1868. 6	  As Huey writes: ‘It comes about […] that just as the complicated but associatively 
concatenated and organized movements of hitting a target with a ball may be touched 
off by the mere sight of the target, in one attention-act, so the various activities 
involved in apperceiving a phrase or other word-group may become one complex but 
unitary act, and this act may be set off very simply by this or that cue or set of cues 
given from the page, and may be done with a minimum of consciousness concerning 
details’ (Huey 105).	  
7 Freud summarizes as follows: ‘correspondence between taboo customs and 
symptoms of compulsion neurosis are most clearly manifested: 1. in the lack of 
motivation of the commandments, 2. in their enforcement through inner need, 3. in 
their capacity for displacement and in the danger of contagion from what is 
prohibited, 4. in the causation of ceremonial actions and commandments which 
emanate from the forbidden’ (Freud, Totem 797). 8	  This recalls Frazer’s comment in his Gifford Lectures: ‘Outside of ourselves there 
stretches away on every side an infinitude of space without sound, without light, 
without colour, a solitude traversed only in every direction by an inconceivably 
complex web of silent and impersonal forces. That, if I understand it aright, is the 
general conception of the world which modern science has substituted for polytheism’ 
(21). 9	   It is a necessity which, as Freud stresses, ‘is itself a part of reality’ (Freud, 
Formulations 42) 
10 My argument here resonates with Robert Dixon’s on links between colonial 
modernity and the management of ‘primitive’ bodies and the primitiveness of the 
body. Dixon in fact invokes ‘eye-strain’, Huey’s preoccupation in his ‘hygiene’ of 
reading, as one of the many modern anxieties formed around the perceived 
inadequacies of the body. He writes: ‘Conceived of as grounded in nature, and 
therefore outside of modernity, the body might be out of step with the modern, 
technologically advanced world. Diagnoses like hysteria, neurasthenia, even 
constipation and eye-strain registered the stress placed on the body by civilisation and 
suggested that compensatory action was necessary’ (Dixon 14-15).  
11 I draw the notion of the ‘conscripted’ reader from Stewart. 	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